

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

---

In the Matter of: )  
 )  
ADOPTION OF COURT SECURITY ) Administrative Order  
STANDARDS AND IMPLEMENTATION ) No. 2017 - 15  
OF COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS )  
 )  
 )  
\_\_\_\_\_ )

Administrative Order No. 2015-104, entered on November 25, 2015, established the Court Security Standards Committee. Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2015-104, the Court Security Standards Committee issued its final report in December 2016, recommending mandatory court security standards and related recommendations for the implementation of those standards, including a three-year phased implementation period and a tiered approach to entryway screening. At its December 2016 meeting, the Arizona Judicial Council recommended adoption of the final report, court security standards, and related implementation recommendations.

Therefore, pursuant to Article VI, Section 3, of the Arizona Constitution,

IT IS ORDERED that the Court Security Standards and related implementation recommendations in Appendix A are adopted effective July 1, 2017. All courts shall comply with the court security standards as adopted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the standards be implemented in a phased three-year period as provided in Appendix B and that entryway screening requirements be established based upon the tiered structure provided in Appendix C.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrative Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts shall have the authority to issue Administrative Directives as necessary to implement these standards including, but not limited to, adopting a process to request an exception to a security standard.

Dated this 8th day of February, 2017.

---

SCOTT BALES  
Chief Justice

**APPENDIX A**

**COURT SECURITY STANDARDS  
AND RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS**

## Governance and Administration

**1. Court Security and Emergency Preparedness Committees.** The presiding judge of the county shall establish a court security and emergency preparedness committee (county SEPC) chaired by the presiding judge of the county or a designee.<sup>1</sup> The county SEPC shall consist of a representative cross-section of each local SEPC in the county. The presiding judge may appoint other members as deemed necessary. The committee shall meet at least twice a year.

The function of each county SEPC includes, but is not limited to, setting goals for implementation of the court security standards, review of local court security plans and self-assessments, coordination of security needs countywide, and ensuring continuous court security improvement.

Additionally, each court building or court complex shall have a court security and emergency preparedness committee (local SEPC) that meets at least quarterly. The chairperson of the local SEPC shall be the presiding judge of the court or a designee and the chairperson shall appoint members of the local SEPC. Local SEPCs shall include at least one representative from law enforcement and a first responder.<sup>2</sup> Local SEPCs shall meet at least quarterly.

The functions of each local SEPC include, but are not limited to, implementation of court security standards adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court within each court; development and allocation of resources necessary for security needs; and coordination of security self-assessments, security drills, and testing of security equipment.

Comment: The make-up of SEPCs should be based on the needs of the varied geographical size and population of each county as well as the structure of each county's court system. Survey results indicate 57.8% of respondent court employees work in courts co-located in buildings with other agencies or entities. The role other agencies or businesses may play in court safety and security is an important aspect of security and emergency preparedness planning that requires inclusion of representatives from those other agencies or entities.

**2. Court Security Manual.** The Arizona AOC shall develop and promulgate a court security manual addressing the basic tenets of court safety and security. The manual shall include court security standards, security assessment tools, security incident and threat reporting forms, personal security tips for judges and court personnel, and templates for written policies on evacuations, hostage situations, sheltering in place, and bomb threats. The manual should also include practical tools, checklists, and templates for use by local courts. Each court shall add additional security-related information unique to the needs and security plans of the court.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> See AO-2005-32, Presiding Judges Authority (establishing duties over court security and facilities).

<sup>2</sup> First Responders as used here refers to medical and emergency personnel such as fire, rescue, or paramedic.

<sup>3</sup> Security manuals shall not be open to the public per Rule 123(e)(4), Arizona Rules of Supreme Court.

**3. Court Security Self-Assessment.** Courts shall conduct a court security self-assessment at least every three years.<sup>4</sup> The local SEPC shall conduct the self-assessment using a security assessment template or checklist and summarize the assessment in a report.<sup>5</sup> However, court security assessments may be conducted by an outside team with members who have knowledge of court security best practices or who are not employed by the court being assessed. Reports of court security self-assessments shall be shared with local and county SEPCs for use in developing plans for security improvement and for resource justification.

**4. Response to a Negative Event.**<sup>6</sup> Court staff shall have a way to report negative events. Each court shall have access to an emergency phone number or access and contact information for a control center operated by law enforcement. Courts shall develop policies related to reporting negative events and shall train employees on those policies.

**5. Incident and Threat Reporting.**<sup>7</sup> The court administrator, lead clerk, or a designee shall report all significant threats made against a court, a judge, or a court employee and all significant incidents that occur within the courthouse or its perimeter. The AOC shall establish a process for reporting incidents and threats and shall develop guidelines for defining criteria for what is a major incident or significant threat.

Recommendation: Two levels of incident reporting are recommended: (a) contemporaneous reporting of significant security threats and incidents to the AOC and to employees and stakeholders to be defined by the AOC, and (b) annual reporting of security incident data by courthouse. Information from the first type of incident report shall be securely shared in real time.<sup>8</sup> The second form of incident reporting should include reports to local and county SEPCs and the AOC.<sup>9</sup>

The second type of report should serve as a basis for determining areas for security improvement and should provide resource and funding request justification from local funding authorities. Moreover, these reports should be required as part of funding requests for monies from the statewide court security fund. This standard follows the national best practice of maintaining records of all threats and incidents for use in local decision-making related to security measures and funding.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Security assessments and security assessment reports shall not be open to the public per Rule 123(e)(4), Arizona Rules of Supreme Court.

<sup>5</sup> See Court Security Guide, 2005, pp. 6-8, National Association for Court Management. Committee members reviewed the detailed Court Security Assessment tool and report template used by the Superior Court in Pima County.

<sup>6</sup> See the Glossary for definition of 'negative event'.

<sup>7</sup> See the Glossary for definition of 'incident', 'threat', and 'significant threat'.

<sup>8</sup> The committee recommends use of a tiered alert system as used by many government agencies and colleges around the country for alerting those in need of emergency alert information.

<sup>9</sup> Incident and threat reports are not open to the public per Rule 123(e)(4), Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court.

<sup>10</sup> See Hall, et. al. *Steps to Best Practices for Court Building Security*, pp. 9-10.

## Entryway Screening

### 6. Entryway Screening.

**(a) Entrances.** Each court shall establish one main entrance through which the public can enter the court building. Additional entryways for the public are allowed if the additional entryways are staffed and use entryway screening of at least one handheld metal detector (magnetometer). Additional entrances may be established to comply with Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) standards; however, appropriate screening of individuals using such entrances is required.

**(b) Screening Devices.** Based upon court activity levels, courts will be categorized into one of three tiers, which will determine the level of entryway screening of visitors to the courthouse, using walk through, or handheld metal detectors (magnetometers). (See Appendix C.) Courts that will not be required to have entryway screening due to low court activity levels shall establish policy and procedure for screening during a high conflict or high-risk event. Courts may also choose to use x-ray (fluoroscope) machines in conjunction with metal detector screening.

Courts that do not have a walk through or handheld metal detector at the time these standards are initially adopted shall obtain at least one handheld device for use in the event of a high-risk event<sup>11</sup> until such time as the entryway screening protocol based on the courts activity level can be accomplished. Entryway screening shall be by trained court security personnel or law enforcement.

**(c) Prohibited Item Signage.** Each court building shall have signage posted at each entrance stating that all persons are subject to search by security personnel and that firearms and dangerous weapons are prohibited pursuant to law. Each court shall provide secure lockers at the entryway for storage of firearms pursuant to law. Law enforcement who come to the court for personal business<sup>12</sup> rather than professional business shall be required to store their firearms in secure lockers the same as other persons.<sup>13</sup> (See Standard 8, Armed Court Personnel in Courthouses for when law enforcement may carry a firearm in a court building.)

**(d) Screening Device Training and Calibration.** Court personnel or security personnel who conduct entryway screening shall be trained and receive refresher training on the operation of the devices that they use. Each court shall ensure that regular calibration and testing of metal detectors and x-ray machines occur.

**(e) Prohibited items.** Courts shall develop a list of items prohibited in the court building.<sup>14</sup> The list shall be a part of the local materials in the court security manual and all employees shall be trained on what are prohibited items.

---

<sup>11</sup> 'High risk event' is defined in the Glossary.

<sup>12</sup> E.g. party to a legal matter, witness in a legal proceeding in a capacity other than official law enforcement duties, or an observer of a legal proceeding where not involved in an official law enforcement capacity.

<sup>13</sup> See Arizona Supreme Court AO 2005-32 and A.R.S. § 38-1113(C)(2) et. seq. (current through 2016).

<sup>14</sup> E.g., Arizona Supreme Court AO 2005-32 establishing authority for presiding judge of county over court security including prohibiting or regulating possession of weapons of potential weapons in the court; e.g. Superior Court for Pima County AO 2014-05 list of items prohibited in the Superior Court of Pima County; Arizona Supreme Court AO 98-0008, list of prohibited items in the Arizona Supreme Court

Policies and procedures shall be developed for the confiscation, handling, and disposition of prohibited items found during entryway screening.<sup>15</sup> Courts shall track the types and amount of contraband detected through screening and maintain monthly reports reflecting that information.

Comment: It is recommended that the AOC develop a list of standard prohibited items that courts should include as a minimum standard in local administrative orders and policies. This list should be part of the tools available in the court security manual for use by local courts.

**7. Court Employee Screening.** In jurisdictions that do not conduct full entryway screening of all employees, each court must develop a policy on, and randomly carry out, court employee screening upon entry to the courthouse.

Comment: Unfortunately, workplace violence is all too common. It is the risk of workplace violence that can be mitigated through periodic employee screening for prohibited items.

**8. Armed Court Personnel in Courthouses.** The presiding judge of the county shall determine whether court security officers may carry firearms in the courthouse for the purpose of maintaining court security.<sup>16</sup> Once the AOC Administrative Director adopts a firearms training program, such training must be completed prior to actively carrying a firearm in the courthouse.<sup>17</sup> Contract security guards with valid armed guard cards shall have six months to complete that training. Moreover, courts with armed court security shall develop protocols for court security officer involved shootings.<sup>18</sup>

Presiding judges of the county shall establish written policies on the carrying of firearms for personal safety by judicial officers or other court staff. Specifically, the policy shall address the following points: who may carry a firearm, the process for registering or otherwise notifying the court and court security of the status of being armed, the process for confirming training requirements, type of firearm and ammunition that can be carried, and the conformance with all applicable state and local statutes and ordinances.<sup>19</sup> Additionally, until such time as AOC adopts firearm training standards, judges or other court staff authorized to carry firearms shall meet the requirements of Arizona law.

---

<sup>15</sup> Such policies and procedures shall be in accord with A.R.S. § 12-941 on the disposal of unclaimed property.

<sup>16</sup> See Arizona Supreme Court AO-2005-32, Presiding Judges Authority (establishing duties over court security). Cf. Arizona Supreme Court AO 98-0008 (weapons in the Arizona State Courts Building); Superior Court of Pima County AO 2014-05 (weapons in Pima County Superior Court).

<sup>17</sup> This training requirement does not apply to law enforcement meeting the training requirements of A.R.S. § 38-1113 (current through 2016) or sheriff's officers who are present pursuant to A.R.S. § 11-411 (current through 2016).

<sup>18</sup> The existing use of force code section for armed probation officers would be an example of a comprehensive use of force policy. See ACJA § 6-112.

<sup>19</sup> Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3102(D) (judges carrying firearms in conformance with orders of presiding judge not subject to offense of misconduct involving weapons).

Comment: It is recommended that courts adopt a policy prohibiting law enforcement officers from carrying firearms in the courthouse unless the officers are appearing for official business, providing court security, or responding to an emergency.<sup>20</sup> The committee further recommends all law enforcement officers who are allowed to carry firearms in the courthouse be required to sign in and record the purpose for the officer's presence at the court and the courtroom(s) in which the officer has business. This sign-in process allows court security to be aware of the officers' location in the courthouse and the official purpose for which they are present. As a general guiding principal, in policy formulation, law enforcement officers should not be permitted to carry weapons in the courthouse when they are present for personal business or in a personal capacity, such as a party to a case or witness or observer to a case where they were not acting in an official law enforcement capacity.<sup>21</sup>

## **In-Custody Defendants**

**9. Entrance for In-Custody Defendants.** Courts shall ensure in-custody defendants are brought into and leave the court building through an entrance separated from any public entrance to the courthouse.

Comment: Courts that cannot meet this standard because of the architectural construction of a building shall have written procedures for ensuring that in-custody defendants are segregated from the public when entering and exiting the court to ensure the safety of all.

**10. In-Custody Defendants; Transport and Control.** In-custody defendants must be transported, controlled, and monitored at all times by appropriately trained court security personnel or law enforcement officer(s).

**11. In-Custody Defendants; Protocols for Taking Individuals into Custody.** Courts shall have written protocols for taking individuals into custody and securing individuals into custody for transport to a detention facility. Courts should make every effort to alert security personnel or law enforcement responsible for transporting detainees in advance if it is anticipated a litigant will be taken into the immediate custody of a county jail or correctional facility, or otherwise taken into custody.

## **Facilities, Alarms, and Equipment**

**12. Duress Alarms.**

*(a) At Public Transaction Counters.* Courts are required to have at least one active and monitored duress alarm "panic button" behind each public transaction counter.

---

<sup>20</sup> See A.R.S. § 38-1113(C)(2) et. seq. (authority to prohibit officers from carrying firearm unless appearing in official capacity or providing security or responding to an emergency).

<sup>21</sup> See A.R.S. § 38-1113(C)(2) et. seq.; Arizona Supreme Court AO 2005-32.

*(b) In the Courtroom.* Courts are required to have active and monitored duress alarm “panic buttons” at the judges’ or other judicial officers’ benches and at the courtroom clerks’ stations.

*(c) Training on and Testing of Duress Alarms.* The court administrator, lead clerk, or a designee shall physically show all employees working in a court building the location of duress alarm “panic buttons” and how and when to use them. The court administrator, lead clerk, or a designee shall ensure testing of duress alarm systems occurs at least quarterly and that such testing is documented. Reports of duress alarm system testing shall be reported to local and county SEPCs.

**13. Locking Protocols.**

*(a) Locked Courtrooms.* Courts shall keep public doors to courtrooms locked at all times when a courtroom is not in use. Courts shall install or obtain a type of locking mechanism that will allow the courtroom and judicial chambers to be locked from the inside to allow for the ability to shelter in place, but will also allow emergency exit, such as crash bars, one way door handles, alarmed doors, or remote locks.

*(b) Locked Jury Deliberation Rooms.* Courts shall keep jury deliberation rooms locked when not in use, unless jury deliberation rooms are behind secured areas.

**14. Courtroom, Jury Room, and Perimeter Sweeps.** Court security, bailiffs, or designees of the presiding judge or court administrator, shall ensure sweeps of courtrooms, hearing rooms, jury deliberation rooms, and the perimeter of the court building are conducted at least daily. Reports of these sweeps shall be maintained.

**15. Secured Access to Non-Public Areas.** Areas of the court not open to the public shall be electronic card-key or hard-key controlled. The court administrator, the lead clerk, or a designee shall ensure that doors remain locked at all times and are not propped open.

**16. Security Cameras.** Courts shall have video cameras in areas including, but not limited to, entryways and common public areas. Security camera systems shall be equipped with recording capability.

**17. Exterior Lighting.** Each court location shall have exterior lighting at building entrances and exits.

Comment: Where a court facility includes parking areas, it is recommended such parking areas also have exterior lighting.

**18. Protection of Critical Locations.** Courts shall prevent unauthorized vehicular access to critical areas with obstacles such as, but not limited to, bollards or natural landscapes.

Comment: Courts that cannot meet this standard because of the architectural construction of a building shall have written procedures for ensuring monitoring of areas where vehicle accessibility is within close proximity to the building.

**19. Window Coverings.** Court windows shall have coverings to prevent views from the outside into the court building. Window coverings must allow visibility from inside to the outside.

**20. Creation of Barriers at Public Transaction Counters.** Clerk transaction counters and public service windows shall have a barrier between the public customers and court staff. The type and manner of barrier shall be a local decision, based upon evaluation of each courts' design and operations.

**21. Bullet-Resistant Material in Courtrooms.** Courtroom benches and staff work areas in courtrooms shall be reinforced with bullet-resistant material.

**22. Data Centers and Electronic Equipment.** Courts with computer data centers shall have separate, secure electronic key-card or hard-key controlled, limited access areas for computer data centers, network equipment, video recording systems, and other critical electronic equipment. Courts shall maintain disaster recovery "hot sites" pursuant to ACJA § 1-507.

## **Training**

**23. New Hire Security Training Requirements.** All court employees, including judges, shall participate in and complete, whether in person or online, a course in court security. That course should address general security principals, the court security manual, personal safety on the job, emergency preparedness including what to do in a negative event, evacuation routes, and sheltering in place protocols.<sup>22</sup>

Comment: It is recognized that judges are subject to a separate orientation program pursuant to ACJA § 1-302 and that court security is generally addressed in that program. However, the committee emphasizes that court security is not a one-size-fits-all topic. As such, court security training provided to newly hired employees, including judges, should not be limited to a one-size-fits-all course that provides generalized content only. Each court will have its own policies and procedures on court security topics such as, but not exclusively: who provides security, what evacuations routes are, how to respond to negative events, who to report security threats and incidents to, and courtroom and courthouse lockdown procedures. In order for effective training to occur, each new employee, including judges, needs to receive training specific to the courthouse they will be working in. Therefore, the committee recommends that the AOC develop new orientation training on court security that has statewide applicability but that the AOC also work with local courts to develop guidelines for training specific to local courts.

---

<sup>22</sup> The committee notes ACJA § 1-302(J)(2) requires new hire orientation for all staff within 90 days of hire. The committee recommends that an amendment be made to § 1-302(J)(2) reducing this time frame to within 30 days of hire.

**24. Annual Security Training Requirements.** All employees of the Arizona Judicial branch, including judicial officers,<sup>23</sup> shall be required to engage in court security-related training or drills annually.

Comment: Security training in the form of broadly applicable training videos is useful for many security-related topics; however, local training and drills that require employees to actively engage the security protocols of a given court are proved to be the most effective method of ensuring employees are prepared to appropriately react to and manage security incidents. As such, the focus of annual training shall be local court security-related drills and training.

**25. In-Service Court Security Officer Training.** Court security officers employed by a court must receive annual training including, but not limited to:

- use of force training;<sup>24</sup>
- metal detection devices and x-ray machines, based on what is used at the officer's court;
- de-escalation tactics;
- defensive tactics;
- active shooter;
- incident reporting;
- policies and procedures on the handling of prohibited items; and
- emergency preparedness.

**26. Contract Court Security Training.** Private contract court security officers shall be subject to the minimum court security training standards established by the AOC for in-house court security officers. Once implemented, contract security with valid guard cards shall complete AOC training within 6 months of hire by a court.

**27. Security Officer Equipment.** Court security officers shall restrict equipment and tools carried on their person to items for which they are trained in the use of and, where applicable, certified in the use of. Security officers shall restrict equipment to items approved by the court security officer-training program adopted by the AOC or otherwise designated by the AOC. Court security officers who are armed shall wear a bulletproof vest that is rated to at least the caliber weapon the officer carries.

**28. Courtroom, Jury Deliberation Room, and Perimeter Sweep Training.** Court employees or court security assigned to conduct daily courtroom, jury deliberation room, or perimeter sweeps shall be trained on how to conduct such sweeps, identification of suspicious items or

---

<sup>23</sup> The committee recommends judges should receive the same amount of security-related training as employees because they are an integral part of security in the courts and they face similar security risks. The committee recommends the ACJA be amended to include specific court security requirements for judges in keeping with the training structure set forth in the ACJA.

<sup>24</sup> The committee recommends that use of force regulations that are similar to ACJA § 6-112 be adopted for court security officers, excluding law enforcement whom the committee recognizes are governed by separate specific use of force laws and regulations.

conditions, protocols for reporting suspicious items or conditions, and securing of the location if a suspicious item or condition is identified.

**29. Court Security Officer Training.** Court security officers shall be trained in accordance with a court security officer training program developed by or approved by the AOC Administrative Director. The Committee makes the following recommendations related to court security officer training:

- A security training workgroup should be developed to collaborate with the AOC Education Services Division to determine the specific training curriculum and annual training hours necessary for an effective, security officer training, education, and certification program.
- Trainers be approved by the AOC or AZ POST certified.
- There be a method for establishing the proficiency of current security officers for purposes of determining if any court security officer training program adopted or approved by the AOC needs to be completed in whole or in part by the officer.
- Court security officers, including contracted private court security, be readily identifiable via clothing or some type of marking on their clothing.

**30. Firearms Training.** Any person providing court security to a court, excluding POST certified law enforcement officers, shall complete training in the use of firearms as designated by the AOC before being allowed to carry a firearm within the court. Contract security with a valid guard card for armed guards shall have six months to complete AOC training.

Comment: The committee recommends that any person, whether court security armed for court security purposes or judges or other court employees authorized to carry a firearm for personal security, complete training similar to that established for Arizona probation officers in the Arizona Code of Judicial Administration. The committee further recommends that firearms standards be adopted for armed court security, excluding POST certified law enforcement officers that are similar to the standards in the Arizona Code of Judicial Administration. The committee recommends that the AOC Administrative Director approve such training and standards.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>25</sup> The committee notes A.R.S. § 13-3102(D) provides for judges to be held to the standard for those who obtain a concealed carry permit. However, the committee strongly encourages that all persons authorized to carry a firearm in a court, excluding law enforcement who have separate training standards, be trained and held to a uniform standard.

## IMPLEMENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Court Security Standards will be implemented via a three-year, phased implementation period for the court security standards. (See Appendix B.)
2. The AOC has established a preliminary structure of tiers for categorizing courts by activity level, which will be used to determine the level of entryway screening. (e.g., Appendix C.)
3. The AOC has developed a process for courts to seek an exception to the standards at the request of the Presiding Judge based either on a request from the court's funding authority or on the Presiding Judge's own initiative, with exceptions encompassing both delay and timing of implementation or departure from standards. Requests for exceptions shall be made on a yearly basis on the form approved by the Administrative Office of the Courts and shall be submitted to the Administrative Director.
4. The AOC shall pursue legislation to establish a statewide court security fund to assist local courts with one-time outlays for security equipment and security system improvements. The fund will be non-lapsing and non-reverting. The AOC shall determine the best source of monies for the fund.

Local courts will continue to pursue local funding for court security personnel and ongoing security-related court operations.

5. The AOC has secured the services of Donald Jacobson as a consultant to assist in the implementation of the court security standards.
6. The AOC shall develop policies and procedures for assessment of or accountability for compliance with the court security standards, particularly standards that require training, certification, and testing.
7. The term of the Court Security Standards Committee is extended by separate Administrative Order.

## GLOSSARY

The following definitions govern the meaning of terms within the standards:

**Standard** - A court security standard is a policy or measure that is required to be in place in order to improve the general state of security in a court building and to ensure the personal safety and security of the public, judges, judicial officers, court staff, city and county employees, and the law enforcement officers and court security officers that protect them.

**Guideline** - A court security guideline is a policy or measure that is recommended to be in place in order to improve the general state of security in a court building and to ensure the personal safety and security of the public, judges, judicial officers, court staff, city and county employees, and the law enforcement officers and court security officers that protect them.

**Incident** - An incident is an action or communication that causes or threatens to cause personal injury, property damage, or disruption of courthouse proceedings.

**Hierarchy of seriousness of incident** - In descending order: (1) incident against persons, (2) incident against property, (3) threats without violence.

**High-risk event** – The following characteristics are commonly associated with high-risk events: multiple victims involved in the matter, incidents involving female victims and multiple offenders, homicides that involve intimate partners and family relationships, celebrated or featured articles or media coverage that are associated with the matter, and demonstrations that may occur before, during, or after hearings or otherwise are associated with the events of the case.<sup>26</sup>

**Negative event** - A negative event is an event that has potential to, or does cause interruption of court operations or poses a risk to the safety and security of those in and around a court facility. Negative events may include, but are not limited to, threats, such as threats to the physical safety of someone on or associated with a court, bomb threats, or suspicious or unattended packages; security incidents such as physical violence, active shooter, hostage taking; and other incidents such as cyber-attacks, medical emergencies, fires, severe weather, or power outages.

**Significant threat** – Any threat against court personnel, including judge and court staff that impacts operations of the court.

**Threat** - A statement of an intention to inflict pain, injury, damage, or other hostile action on someone (court employee) or an institution (court building) in retribution for something done or not done now or in the future. A threat is synonymous with a threatening remark, warning, or ultimatum such as a menace to a person or institution. A threat can be a person or a thing likely to cause damage or danger.

---

<sup>26</sup> See National Association for Court Management, *Court Security Guide* p. 24. June 2005

**APPENDIX B**

**CHART OF PHASED THREE-YEAR  
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN**

Standard	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3
<b>Governance &amp; Administration</b> Court Security Committee (SEPC) Security Self-Assessment & Report Security Manual Incident Response Policies Incident Reporting Policies Policy on Armed Personnel Other Security Policies	✓		
<b>In-Custody Defendants</b>	✓		
<b>Training</b>  <div style="text-align: right; padding-right: 20px;">New Hire Training</div> <div style="text-align: right; padding-right: 20px;">Annual Court Employee Training</div> <div style="text-align: right; padding-right: 20px;">Task Specific Training</div> <div style="text-align: right; padding-right: 20px;">Security Officer Training</div> <div style="text-align: right; padding-right: 20px;">Firearms Training</div>		✓	
		✓	
			✓
<b>Facilities &amp; Equipment</b>  <div style="text-align: right; padding-right: 20px;">Duress Alarms</div> <div style="text-align: right; padding-right: 20px;">Locking Protocols</div> <div style="text-align: right; padding-right: 20px;">Courtroom, Jury Room, Perimeter Sweeps</div> <div style="text-align: right; padding-right: 20px;">Secured Access to Non-Public Areas</div> <div style="text-align: right; padding-right: 20px;">Cameras</div> <div style="text-align: right; padding-right: 20px;">Exterior Lighting</div> <div style="text-align: right; padding-right: 20px;">Window Coverings</div> <div style="text-align: right; padding-right: 20px;">Public Counters, Benches, &amp; Clerk Stations</div> <div style="text-align: right; padding-right: 20px;">Protecting Critical Areas</div>		✓	
<b>Entryway Screening</b>  <div style="text-align: right; padding-right: 20px;">Visitors</div> <div style="text-align: right; padding-right: 20px;">Employees</div>			✓

**APPENDIX C**

**TIERED ENTRYWAY SCREENING REQUIREMENTS  
BASED ON COURT ACTIVITY LEVEL**

<b>Court Hearing Frequency &amp; Judicial Officers</b>	<b>Level of Entryway Screening</b>
1. One or more full-time judicial officers, court proceedings occur throughout daily business hours and on a daily basis	Entryway screening during courthouse business hours e.g., business hours are 8:00 a.m. – 5:00 p.m. <sup>27</sup>
2. Full-time or part-time judicial officer(s), court proceedings held to 2 to 3 days a week and occur only a few hours a day (court proceedings do not occur daily throughout the week)	Entryway screening during hours of court proceedings. e.g., court proceedings occur Tuesday and Wednesday 8:30 a.m. to noon.
3. Single full-time judicial officer or part-time judicial officer(s), court proceedings occur infrequently (generally occur 1 to 2 days a week and only a few hours each day)	Request for exemption from regular entryway screening standard; however, entryway screening should occur upon request of a judicial officer for a high conflict or high-risk hearing.

---

<sup>27</sup> National Center for State Courts Best Practices for Court Security, 2016, recommends screening stations be staffed 30 minutes before and after business hours or court proceeding hours.